Threefold Division of Sensibles according to Thomas Aquinas 
- Essential sensibles:
- Proper sensibles: color, sound, odor, flavor, tactile qualities
- Common sensibles: motion/rest, shape, dimension, number
- Incidental sensibles:
- Particular intentions: this man, this chair
- Universal intentions: man, chair
Example: Threefold division of sensibles in the duck-rabbit
- Proper sensible: color – black, white (vision)
- Common sensibles: shape, dimension (vision)
- Incidental sensibles: this duck; this rabbit (cogitative)
 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Sent. d. 49, q. 2, a. 2c; In de Anima II. lt. 13; ST I. 17. 2; 78. 3c & ad 2. Cf. In Sensu, I, lt. 1.
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, xl, 194′.
 In relation to sensation, these particular intentions – this duck and this rabbit – are incidental sensibles, however, as proper to the cogitative they could be called essential perceptibles, which would distinguish them from sensibles and intelligibles. To be more specific still, they are factual percepts as distinct from actional or action-oriented percepts, like this object as amiable, desirable, harmful, terrifying, etc. (cf. In de Anima III. lt. 4; ST I-II. 9.1 ad2)“We should distinguish between the object of fear and the cause of fear. Thus a face which inspires fear or delight (the object of fear or delight), is not on that account its cause, but – one might say – its target.” Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §476. I owe the distinction between factual and action-oriented intentions or percepts to Mark Barker, The Cogitative Power: Objects and Terminology. unpublished doctoral dissertation; Houston, TX: University of ST. Thomas Center for Thomistic Studies, 2007.